After one-and-a-half years of political turbulence – marked by the 2024 student‑led mass uprising that toppled autocratic prime minister Sheikh Hasina and months of national debate over democratic renewal and reform – millions of Bangladeshis cast their ballots on February 12, 2026. National and international observers described it as one of the most significant electoral exercises in South Asia this year.
Tanveer Mohiuddin, 32, waited with excitement to cast his first-ever vote. Though registered since 2012, he had not voted in the 2014, 2018, or 2024 national parliament elections. “What’s the point of voting in a staged election?” he told The Diplomat, recalling years of political stagnation and disillusionment. 
But this time, he was eager to cast a ballot. And he was far from alone. The queue stretched for hundreds of meters, and he had to wait nearly an hour under the morning sun. “The center was transparent, orderly, and highly secured,” Mohiuddin said, noting the law enforcement personnel maintaining order. 
“Finally, it feels like my vote matters.”
By the end of a largely peaceful and orderly polling day, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won a landslide victory. They won 209 seats out of 297 declared constituencies among 300. With 212 seats belonging to their coalition, the BNP secured a clear majority in the National Parliament – an emphatic rebound for a party that had been out of power for nearly 20 years. 
The BNP’s main rival – the Jamaat‑e‑Islami (JI)-led alliance, which also included the youth-led National Citizen Party (NCP) – emerged as the principal opposition with 77 seats. Of those, the JI won 68; the NCP won six.
The election was held alongside a nationwide constitutional referendum on the implementation of the July Charter. Given a simple “yes” or “no” choice, a substantial majority of voters chose to endorse reforms aimed at strengthening governance and institutional checks. 
The voter turnout was 59.44 percent.
“A New Benchmark” for Bangladesh’s Elections
For Bangladesh, this scale of democratic participation – with 50 parties and over 127 million registered voters – reinforced the election’s significance. International observers, including the Commonwealth Observer Group, described this election as “one of the largest and most significant electoral exercises worldwide in 2026.”
The European Union Election Observation Mission said the vote was “credible and competently managed,” praising the Election Commission’s professionalism. The EOM noted that the contest was genuinely competitive and broadly respected fundamental freedoms, setting “a new benchmark for future polls” in Bangladesh.
“Frankly, I had expected the worst,” said Mirza M. Hassan, Ph.D., an adviser at the Governance and Politics cluster, BRAC Institute of Governance and Development. “Many thought there could be terrible violence and feared the Awami League might resort to violence, and even that India could attempt, in some way, to sabotage the election. I was worried the government might fail to control the law-and-order situation. But none of that happened. From that perspective, it is both good news and a relief that the election was held properly.”
He noted that the mere holding of an election after a prolonged political crisis was significant, even though concerns remain.
“After such a long time, having an election is definitely a positive development,” he added. “Of course, various questions have been raised – particularly by the opposition – about certain votes and the counting process. But overall, in my view, the election was good.”

A young woman casts her ballot at a polling station. Voters aged 18 to 37 – who make up about 43 percent of Bangladesh’s electorate – play a decisive role in shaping the nation’s future. Photo by Mehedi Hasan.
The Rise of Islamist Parties and a Test for the BNP
With its two-thirds majority, the BNP will enter the 14th Jatiya Sangsad (National Parliament) with a comfortable position, far surpassing the 151‑seat threshold required for a simple majority. This outcome empowers the party to govern without the need for large coalitions and marks a milestone: BNP’s return to power after nearly 20 years away from leadership.
However, JI’s re‑emergence as the principal opposition force marks one of the most remarkable – and contentious – features of the election. The new parliament will be marked by an Islamist opposition led by the JI alliance.
Before the 2024 interim government lifted the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami, JI had been largely politically marginalized for more than a decade. Its party registration was canceled in 2013, preventing JI from contesting elections amid accusations of opposing Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 and violating the constitution. 
Historically, the party did hold parliamentary representation – winning 18 seats in 1991, three in 1996, and 17 in 2001 – and even joined coalition governments with the BNP, with its leaders holding ministerial posts. However, its role during Bangladesh’s struggle for independence kept it controversial, particularly among secular activists and minority communities. JI opposed the independence of Bangladesh and supported Islamic governance and associations with radical student wings like Islami Chhatra Shibir. 
After a long time, JI’s dramatic comeback in 2026 signals both its organizational resilience and the broader political realignment that has taken place in the wake of mass protests and institutional reforms. Its resurgence as a major opposition bloc shifts Bangladesh’s parliamentary dynamics. JI’s seats give it a strong platform to challenge the BNP’s policies, especially on social, cultural, and religious matters.
Other parties will play increasingly important roles as issue‑driven voices. The NCP’s six seats – although lower than expected – could influence debates on youth, labor, and social policy. Independent MPs and smaller Islamic parties may also shape niche agendas, particularly on rural development, education, and minority rights.
Importantly, this parliament also reflects regional voting patterns. The BNP’s dominance was strongest in major urban centers (Dhaka, Chittagong and Sylhet), while JI made notable gains in some border districts, particularly in the northern and southwestern parts of the country – a factor that could drive more regionally focused discourse in legislative sessions.
The next speaker and other key parliamentary posts will likely be filled by seasoned BNP parliamentarians, shaping both the legislative agenda and the pace of democratic reform. The challenge for the BNP will be to manage internal party discipline, balancing hardliners and pragmatists as the party transitions from opposition to governance.

Security forces patrol after the BNP’s rally on Oct. 28 2023, a sign of the heavy-handed approach to other political parties while Hasina and the Awami League were still in power. Photo by Saqlain Rizve.
This time, the BNP faces a fundamentally different political environment compared to its previous tenure in opposition against the center-left Awami League. Whereas past debates allowed the BNP to position itself as a moderate conservative counterweight to Awami League’s progressive policies, the presence of a JI-led Islamist coalition as the principal opposition introduces new complexities. 
JI’s historical ties to controversial positions in the 1971 Liberation War and its advocacy for conservative Islamic governance mean that parliamentary debates may now revolve heavily around religious, social, and cultural issues, making it more challenging for the BNP to pursue progressive reforms in education, gender equality, labor rights, or civil liberties. The ideological contrast between the BNP’s pragmatic conservatism and JI’s rigid Islamic stance could slow legislative decision-making and require careful negotiation to pass even routine policy measures.
During the interim government’s tenure, efforts to introduce progressive social reforms ran up against strong resistance from religious and Islamist groups, highlighting how contentious gender and cultural issues can be. Islamist parties and conservative organisations rejected the recommendations of the Women’s Affairs Reform Commission, labeling them incompatible with religious values and calling for the commission’s abolition. 
Cultural and educational reforms faced similar hurdles. The interim government’s plan to appoint dedicated music and physical education teachers in government primary schools was reversed in November 2025, after the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education amended recruitment rules to drop the newly created posts. The decision was influenced by pressure from religious groups, including JI, as proponents of conservative education argued for greater focus on religious instruction. 
Cultural and gender-related policy battles will likely continue in the new parliament, shaping how the BNP navigates both social reform and governance priorities.
“In fact, it might have been healthier for democracy if the BNP had secured only a simple majority,” Hassan said. “A two-thirds majority reduces competition, and in Bangladesh’s history, such overwhelming mandates have often been abused. The most extreme example, of course, was during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure.” 
Hassan cautioned that such dominance gives the ruling party sweeping institutional power.
“A two-thirds majority is inherently dangerous because it allows the government to amend the constitution, change laws – essentially reshape the system to suit its interests,” he explained. “Even in restoring the caretaker government system, there could be different forms of political engineering.”
For Hassan, the coming years will be a critical test of BNP’s democratic commitment.
“Now we will see the true political character of the BNP,” he said. “But what happens two years from now remains uncertain. Bangladesh has a long history of political instability, and whether the BNP can govern in a genuinely democratic manner is still an open question.”
He also suggested that ideology in Bangladeshi politics remains fluid, with potential long-term implications.
“JI has a clearer ideological foundation, but parties like the BNP, Awami League, or Jatiya Party have historically been more pragmatic than ideological,” Hassan noted. “At present, the BNP appears center-right. But politics is flexible here – it could move further right if circumstances demand. That shift could influence key areas such as women’s rights, education policy, and the broader ideological direction of the state.”
“Historically, Jamaat received 8-12 percent of the vote. But this time they got about 30-31 percent. Along with other religion-based parties, Islamic forces have reached about 30-35 percent. So the BNP will not take steps that provoke Islamic forces,” he predicted.
“As a result, Bangladesh may shift further to the right, and political Islam may gain a stronger foundation.”
Referendum Victory: Constitutional Changes Ahead
Bangladeshis also voted on an extensive reform package that will reshape the country’s political system. According to the Election Commission’s figures, approximately 48,074,429 people voted “Yes” in favor of the reforms – 68 percent of total votes cast – while 22,565,627 (about 32 percent) voted “No.” This decisive majority gives formal legitimacy to a reform agenda that had previously been criticized for limited public consultation and widespread uncertainty among voters about its detailed provisions. 
The July Charter proposed a comprehensive set of 84 reforms, 48 of which would require constitutional amendments. These were the specific focus of the referendum question that voters were asked to accept or reject. The remainder are reforms meant to be enacted through ordinary laws, ordinances, or executive action once the constitutional framework is amended. 
The referendum result carries immediate constitutional consequences. Under the Charter framework, the newly elected parliament is expected to function simultaneously as a legislative body and a constituent assembly for up to 180 days to incorporate the reforms into the Bangladesh Constitution. 
This process includes establishing a new upper house, introducing proportional representation in part of the parliamentary system – a change likely to benefit smaller parties – and revising procedures for forming future caretaker governments. 
This decisive majority indicates public backing for structural constitutional change after years of authoritarian leadership and political instability. However, it also places significant political and institutional responsibility on the incoming government. The reforms provide a legal framework for pursuing electoral fairness, transparency, civil liberties protections, and stronger checks on executive power, but their implementation will require parliamentary approval, detailed legislative drafting, and political consensus – particularly given that major parties, including the BNP, had previously expressed reservations about aspects of the Charter.
The referendum also gives the next parliament and government a clear popular mandate to embark on ambitious legal restructuring. For the BNP, which has secured a commanding parliamentary majority, this represents both an opportunity and a test. Successfully implementing reforms could help restore confidence in democratic institutions after years of political upheaval. Failure, however, could deepen political divisions and revive criticism that constitutional reform was used more as a political instrument than a genuine democratic transformation.
The Charter’s approval is therefore only the beginning of a complex constitutional transition. Its implementation – and the relationship between the elected government and the interim reform framework – will shape Bangladesh’s political trajectory, institutional balance of power, and democratic credibility for years to come.
However, even with the referendum’s clear stamp of approval from voters, the path to implementing the July Charter reforms faces immediate challenges. Although newly elected BNP MPs have taken their parliamentary oaths, they refused to take the oath as members of the Constitution Reform Council, the body responsible for carrying out the reforms. BNP leaders said the Constitution currently lacks clear provisions on the council, such as who can administer the oath and under what legal framework. The party has stated it will take the council oath only after Parliament formally incorporates the necessary provisions through a constitutional amendment, insisting that their actions remain fully within the limits of the Constitution.
In contrast, the 77 MPs from the JI-led coalition have taken both oaths.
Those MPs who have taken the oath could still move forward with constitutional changes on their own. However, politically, the BNP’s refusal to join the council raises doubts about how fully the party will cooperate with the reform process, which could make it harder for the new parliament to implement structural changes smoothly.
“Regarding the referendum, there is doubt whether it will stand legally. Many lawyers and experts are saying its constitutional basis is weak. But the political reality is – the people supported it,” Hassan said.
“Everything now depends on political strength – especially how much pressure JI and the NCP can create.” 

The newly elected members of Parliament of the BNP take the oath of office on February 17, 2026. Photo provided by the BNP Media Cell.
Potential Challenges for the New Government
Despite its commanding electoral victory and broad referendum support, the BNP government faces a series of formidable challenges that could define its first term.
After years of political polarization and years under interim governments, the BNP must quickly demonstrate effective governance. Citizens expect job creation, inflation control, improvements in public services, and anti‑corruption measures. Failure to deliver could rapidly erode popular support.
Meanwhile, JI’s robust opposition presence means that legislative debates could be contentious. The BNP must manage its internal factions and resist polarization that could paralyze parliamentary business. Moreover, smaller parties and independents, though limited in seats, may form issue‑based alliances that complicate policy passage.
Passing reform bills derived from the referendum will not be straightforward. The reforms – while popular – involve detailed legal workmanship and consensus-building. This demands competent legislative drafting skills and sincere engagement with civil society stakeholders.
Finally, with significant parts of the population aligned with very different political visions – from secular activists to religious conservatives – the BNP must pursue inclusive governance to avoid social fragmentation.
But perhaps the most pressing challenge is keeping Bangladesh’s economy afloat. 
Dr. Selim Raihan, professor at the Department of Economics, University of Dhaka, and executive director of the South Asian Network on Economic Modeling (SANEM), told The Diplomat that the new government faces “an extremely challenging” economic landscape.
“The economy is indeed in a fragile state,” he said. “Over the past several years, especially since COVID, Bangladesh has faced one shock after another. Economic growth, job creation, and private investment have all been affected. Inflation remains high, and investment, particularly in the private sector, has stagnated for almost a decade.”
Raihan linked the economic strain to the 2024 July–August youth-led movement, which centered on employment opportunities. “The protests highlighted the critical lack of jobs and stagnant investment. Even the growth figures presented by the previous government were somewhat inflated and did not reflect the real employment situation,” he explained.
During the interim period, he noted some modest improvements, such as stabilized foreign reserves, but cautioned that these were largely a result of low demand rather than structural reform. “Inflation remains elevated, growth is slowing, and private sector investment is still in poor condition,” he said.
Raihan emphasized that addressing these challenges will require a coordinated effort across multiple ministries, including the Finance, Commerce, Planning, Industry, and even Home Ministry, to ensure law and order. Key reforms, he added, include banking sector reform, central bank and taxation reforms, trade policy adjustments, budget management, and tackling entrenched corruption.
Raihan also flagged political tensions as a potential obstacle to stabilizing the economy. “The July Charter referendum has sparked disagreements among the BNP, JI, and NCP. If political conflict escalates, the government’s focus on economic reform could be constrained. Just because an election has happened doesn’t mean political disagreements vanish overnight.”
Overall, he predicted the public won’t wait patiently for their lives to improve. “People will watch closely whether inflation is controlled, law and order improves, investment rises, and jobs are created. Normally, a new government enjoys a two-year honeymoon period, but this government will likely face public pressure for results within six months,” Raihan said.
Hassan noted that “the biggest challenge” will be establishing the rule of law. “Bangladesh has never truly had the rule of law. The judiciary and police have never been able to function independently. If the BNP truly wants to establish the rule of law, that will be his [Tarique Rahman’s] biggest task. But whether he can do it – that is uncertain,” said Hassan.
“Regarding freedom of speech, I am also doubtful. Whether journalists will be able to investigate corruption – that will determine how much freedom of speech actually exists,” he added.